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SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS OF SECURITIES
By LELAND E. MODESITT

Leland E. Modesitt received his B.S.
and LL.B. degrees from the University of Colorado. He is a member of
the Colorado, Denver, and American Bar Associations and has written several previous articles on securities law.

The emphasis which has been placed upon the qualification
of public offerings of securities by issuing corporations, known
as primary distributions, has tended to obscure the problems which
arise after the completion of such offerings. A large part of what
has been said and written to explain the "latent ambiguities" of
federal and state securities laws deals with the obligations of an
issuer in quest of public financing. The insider in quest of public
financing stays backstage, well beyond the footlights where he may,
if he is so inclined, unobtrusively change the scenery.
Generally speaking, a secondary distribution is a distribution
by persons other than the issuer of securities. A distribution, as
the name implies, involves indiscriminate sales of a substantial
amount of securities and not a few sporadic, restricted transactions.
Thus, offerings by large stockbrokers such as promoters, officers,
directors, trusts and insurance companies usually constitute secondary distributions.
It is a common practice to issue substantial amounts of stock
to promoters in exchange for properties and services, prior to the
solicitation of the public for required corporate financing. When
the primary offering is made by the corporation the prospectus or
offering circular discloses the nature of the properties and business
and how much promotional stock there is in relation to the shares
sold for cash. Hence, the buyer is in a position to consider how
much "water" there is, and whether the issue is relatively attractive at the stated offering price.
The promoters, officers and directors generally hold their
shares until the corporation's public financing has been completed.
At least they are fairly discreet about any sales made during this
period. Although this is required by law where the primary offering has been made pursuant to Regulation A,1 there is a sound
1 17 C. F. R. § 230. 251-62 (Supp. 1957).
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business reason in that concurrent sales by insiders would undermine the primary distribution of the issuer. After the primary
offering has been completed and a market for the shares so distributed has been established, most insiders can never be completely indifferent to the market situation. The amount, and the
time when they sell varies according to individual conceptions of
legal restrictions, the inherent value and growth potential of the
shares, the desire for immediate cash funds and various other factors, but sooner or later these promotional shares reach the market.
The provisions of the Securities Act of 19332 with respect to the
sale of securities by an issuing corporation are reasonably explicit;
but, considering that some control of sales by affiliates is equally
in the public interest, the statutory provisions applicable to such
transactions ale remarkably devious. These provisions are:
Sec. 4. [Exempted Transactions] (1) "Transactions by
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer;
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering; or transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter
no longer acting as an underwriter in respect of the security involved in such transaction), except transactions
taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the
first date upon which the security was bona fide offered
to the public by, the issuer or by or through an underwriter
and transactions in a security as to which a registration
statement has been filed taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the first effective date of such
registration statement or prior to the expiration of forty
days after the first date upon which the security was bona
fide offered to the public by the. issuer or by or through
an underwriter after such effective date, whichever is later
(excluding in the computation of such forty days any time
during which a stop order issued under section 8 is in
effect as to the security), and except transactions as to securities constituting the whole or part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant
in the distribution of such securities by the issuer or by
or through the underwriter."
'48

Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. §

77 (a) to (o)

(1952).
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(2) "Brokers' transactions, executed upon customers'
orders on any exchange or in the open or counter market,
but not the solicitation of such orders."

Sec. 2 (4) "The term 'issuer' means every person who
issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with
respect to certificates of deposit, voting-trust certificates, or
collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates
of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust
not having a board of directors (or persons performing similar functions) or of the fixed, restricted management, or
unit type, the term 'issuer' means the person or persons
performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or
manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other
agreement or instrument under which such securities are
issued; except that in the case of an unincorporated association which provides by its articles for limited liability of
any or all of its members, or in the case of a trust, committee, or other legal entity, the trustees or members thereof
shall not be individually liable as issuers of any security
issued by the association, trust, committee, or other legal
entity; except that with respect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities, the term 'issuer' means the person
by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used
and except that with respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, the term 'issuer'
means the owner of any such right or of any interest in
such right (whether whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests therein for the purpose of public offering."

Sec. 2 (11) "The term 'underwriter' means any person
who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers
or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of
any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any
such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person
whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary
distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this paragraph the term 'issuer' shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
under direct or indirect
3
common control with the issuer."
'Ibid.

Emphasis supplied.
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As in the case of many problems arising under this federal law,
it is impossible to weave the statutory provisions into a categorical
rule governing all sales by insiders. A number of factors remain undefined. What constitutes "distribution," "direct or indirect participation" or "direct or indirect common control" under section 2 (11)?
Does section 4 (2) mean what it says, and if so, what constitutes an
unsolicited order?
In the Matter of Thompson Ross Securities Co.,' it was held that
the president of a corporation who owned 18% of the outstanding
stock and who had managed and formulated policies for the corporation for over ten years was a controlling person, and a dealer
purchasing from him was held to be an underwriter under section
2 (11). In discussing the question of control the Commission stated:
"The question of 'control' is a factual question. 'Control' is not synonymous with ownership of 51% of the vot'6S. E. C. 1111 (1940).

OVER

56

"Current"
FRIENDS

P 1)

... DESIGNED TO HELP YOU TO

Live Better Electricallq
at the touch of your hand.
Set a dial... an electric range cooks your
meals just right ... your laundry is

washed and dried sunshine fresh. Turn a
switch ... entertainment fills your livingroom.
Remember, nothing else gives you so much
value for so little cost.
PUBI31C SZIVICE COMPANY

ol Colorado

DICTA

May-June, 1957

ing stock of a corporation. Where power exists to direct the
management and policies of a corporation, 'control' within
the meaning of Sec. 2 (11) exists even though the persons
who possess that power do not own a majority of the corporation's voting stock."
Possibly the most controversial case involving a number of the
problems of secondary distributions was In the Matter of Ira Haupt
and Co.0 From December 15, 1943 to June 1, 1944 Ira Haupt and Co.,
a New York Stock Exchange firm, sold approximately 93,000 shares
of the common stock of Park and Tilford Inc., on behalf of
the Schulte interests, who together owned some 91% of the outstanding stock. On December 15, 1943, when the market price of the
stock was about $57, Schulte publicly announced that Park and Tilford, Inc., was considering a distribution of whiskey to its shareholders at cost. Following the announcement the price steadily advanced to a high of 981/4 on May 26, 1944. On that day Park and Tilford, Inc., offered to sell to its stockholders at a reduced price six
cases of whiskey for each share of stock. On May 31, 1944, the Office
of Price Administration limited the negotiability of the purchase
rights and the maximum profits on resale of the liquor. The price
of the stock dropped 10V8 points that day and reached a low of 30%
in June. During this period the Haupt firm transacted all sales for
Schulte over the New York Stock Exchange. The sell orders commenced with 200 or 300 share blocks but within three months the
firm was authorized to sell up to 50,000 shares at 80 or better. It
was stipulated that during the period of five and a half months
when the 93,000 shares were sold, approximately 89,000 had been
sold without any solicitation.
In an administrative proceeding against the Haupt firm it was
argued that the transactions were exempt as broker's transactions
under section 4 (2). One of the principal contentions of Haupt was
that a precise number of shares to be publicly dispersed is an essential element of a distribution.
The Commission had no trouble tying the Haupt firm into the
violation. It stated: "Nor do we think that a distribution loses its
character as such merely because the extent of the offering may
depend upon certain conditions such as market price."' The ComId. at 1119. See also S. E. C. v.Kaye Real & Co., 122 F. Supp. 639 (S. D. N. Y. 1954).
023S

E C. 589 (1946).
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mission also rejected the firm's claim that it was not aware of the
distribution intended by the Schulte interests. The Commission
pointed out that only 7,000 shares of the stock had been traded on
the exchange in the entire month of November; that 24,500 shares
had been traded in the first two days following the announcement
of the impending whiskey dividend; and that an additional 115,000
shares had been traded during the rest of that month. Under all
the circumstances the Commission found that the only reasonable
conclusion that could have been reached was that it was intended
that a large block would be sold.
Haupt also contended that substantially all sales were unsolicited transactions within the section 4 (2) exemption, but the
Commission stated:
"We conclude that Section 4 (2) cannot exempt transactions by an underwriter executed over the Exchange in
connection with a distribution for a controlling stockholder.
Respondent has suggested that this conclusion is contrary
to administrative interpretations issued by our staff and to
the implications in recent orders issued in connection with
applications of The United Corporation under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act with respect to United's sale
of common stock of a subsidiary through brokers on the
New York Stock Exchange. The administrative interpretations referred to were to the general effect that an underwriter selling for a controlling stockholder over the ex7

Id at 600.
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change might conceivably be entitled to the exemption
under Section 4 (2) if his activities were confined strictly
to the usual brokerage functions, but that, as a practical
matter, his activities could not be so confined in connection
With a distribution of any substantial block of securities.
These interpretations arrived at the same ultimate result
as that which we have reached here. But the theory and
the qualification of the interpretation-which we agree are
inconsistent with our conclusion herein-were developed
against the background of a very different market than is
now prevalent. It has been only comparatively recently
that the problem has been presented in the context of a
market in which large blocks can frequently be sold without solicitations or other sales activity. In that context,
the invalidity of the theory on which the interpretations
were based has become apparent. We have reached our
present conclusion on this phase of the case after careful
consideration of the entire problem and, to the extent that
the administrative interpretations referred to and the principle involved in the United case may be inconsistent with
that conclusion, they must be overruled."'
The United Corporation was a public utility holding company
order to divest itself of the stock of operating subsidiaries under
the Holding Company Act. Between December, 1945 and May, 1946,
it sold on the New York Stock Exchange 600,000 shares of common
stock of its subsidiary, Columbia Gas & Electric Company. An
exemption under section 4 (1) & (2) was assumed from the Commission's silence, because there was clear control and no registration
statement.
The above quoted excerpt from the Haupt case served to support the view of the securities industry that the Commission's
inaction on the United Corporation offering, which was a secondary
distribution if there ever was one, was consistent with the policy
it had theretofore followed to the effect that unsolicited trans' Id. at 607. The proceeding against Haupt was based upon § 15 (b) of the Exchange Act of
1934, which provides for the revocoton of the registration of a broker dealer for a willful violation
of the 1933 act and the regulations and rules thereunder as well as for other reasons. The Commission found that there had been a willful violation of the 1933 act but withheld revocation of the
license because the Commission had reversed its previous position on the § 4 (2) exemption. The
Not'l Ass'n of Security Dealers followed this up with a twenty day suspension.

LU
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actions for an affiliate of the issuer did not make the broker an
underwriter notwithstanding that he was selling for an issuer within
the meaning of section 2 (11). Thus, under this policy the broker's
part of the transaction was exempt under section 4 (2) and the
affiliate's part of the transaction was exempt under section 4 (1)
because the affiliate was not an issuer, underwriter or dealer.
The Commission's remarks about the United case were unfortunate. it is rather difficult to accept the explanation that the administrative interpretations (which apparently prevailed as late as
1946 in favor of United Corporation) "were developed against the
background of a very different market" from that which existed at
the time of the Haupt case, considering that the Haupt sales cccurred almost two years prior to the United sales. In several cases
prior to Haupt it was clearly stated that dealers purchasing from
controlling stockholders with a view to distribution, as well as persons selling for such stockholders in connection with the distribution, are "underwriters."9
The Haupt case was consistent with established precedent. The
United case was no part of such precedent. It was an exception. Perhaps the exigency of divestment under the Holding Company Act
of 193510 justified the exception, but the Commission in the Haupt
case, rather than climbing back over this thorny limb simply sawed
it off.
In any event the Haupt case clearly pointed up the precarious
position of a selling affiliate and his broker. Where would the
line be drawn between the egregious transactions of the Schulte
interests and the case of Assistant Secretary Joe Pumpernickel,
who has waited three years to sell a few shares of Uncompagre Oil,
Inc.?
In 1951 the Commission promulgated Rule 154 which provides:
"Definition of Certain Terms Used in Section 4(2)
(a) The term 'brokers' transactions' in Section 4 (2) of
the Act shall be deemed to include transactions by a broker
acting as agent for the account of any person controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer of
the securities which are the subject of the transactions
where(1) The broker performs no more than the usual
and customary broker's function,
9

In the Matter of Resources Corp. Internat'l, 7 S. E. C. 689 (1940); In the Matter of Thompson
Ross Securities Co., 6 S. E. C. 1111 (1940); In the Matter of Sweets Steel Co., 4 S. E. C. 589 (1939);
SEC v. Saphier, 1 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 291 (1936).
S049 Stat. 838, 15 U. S. C. §§ 79 (a)-(z) (6) (1952).
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(2) The broker does no more than execute an order
or orders to sell as a broker and receives no more than
the usual or customary broker's commission, and the
broker's principal, to the knowledge of the broker,
makes no payment in connection with the execution
of such transactions to any other person.
(3) Neither the broker, nor to his knowledge his
principal, solicits or arranges for the solicitation of
orders to buy in anticipation of or in connection with
such transactions, and
(4) The broker is not aware of circumstances indicating that his principal is an underwriter in respect
of the securities or that the transactions are part of a
distribution of securities on behalf of his principal.
(b) For the purpose of paragraph (a) of this Rule, the
term 'distribution' shall not apply to transactions involving
an amount not substantial in relation to the number of
shares or units of the security outstanding and the aggregate volume of trading in such security. Without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, the term 'distribution' shall
not be deemed to include a sale or series of sales of securities which, together with all other sales of securities of the
same class by or on behalf of the same person within the
preceding period of six months, will not exceed the following: (1) if the security is traded only otherwise than on a
securities exchange, approximately one percent of the
shares or units of such security outstanding at the time of
receipt by the broker of the order to execute such transactions or (2) if the security is admitted to trading on a securities exchange the lesser of approximately (A) one per
cent of the shares or units of such security outstanding at
the time of receipt by the broker of the order to execute
such transactions or (B) the largest aggregate reported
volume of trading on securities exchange during any one
week within the four calendar weeks preceding the receipt of such order.
(c) The term 'solicitation of such orders' in Section
4 (2) of the Act shall be deemed to include the solicitation
of an order to buy a security, but shall not be deemed to include the solicitation of an order to sell a security.
(d) Where within the previous 60 days a dealer has
made a written bid for a security or a written solicitation
of an offer to sell such security, the term 'solicitation' in
Section 4 (2) shall not be deemed to include an inquiry
regarding the dealer's bid or solicitation.""
As a practical matter, this rule afforded very little relief. It
codified the conclusions reached in the Haupt case, including certain subjective tests, such as the broker's knowledge of his principal's activities, and provided a laborious formula for determining
what transaction shall be deemed not to constitute a "distribution"
by a selling stockholder.
It17 C.

F. R. 230.154 (Supp. 1957).
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The availability of the section 4 (2) exemption remains a complex question of fact with respect to which the broker and the selling stockholder must act as their judgment dictates. Now that the
Regulation A exemption is not available for secondary offerings by
stockholders of newly organized corporations the restraint of conscience may well diminish.
In practice insiders generally observe a minimum holding period of one year to establish the requisite initial intention of purchasing from an issuer for investment and not with a view to distribution. Such intention is not established ipso facto, but by that
time many corroborative circumstances can be established. The
holder of investment stock by reason of promotional services rendered may divorce himself from management, or may sell in small
blocks to meet unanticipated financial reversals. The business and
purposes of the issuer may change drastically. There may be a merger which disrupts the original corporate plans and dilutes the control attributable to ownership of equity securities.
Selling unregistered securities allegedly taken for investment,
even where the seller is not in common control of the issuer, is not
without some risk to both principal and dealer,' 2 but experience
indicates that the risk is largely theoretical. Assuming there is no
U

The General Counsel of the Commission received an inquiry whether a dealer might resell
to the public, without registration, a block of securities bought from an initial purchaser who had
acquired the securities in conrection with a "private offering." Port of his reply, with respect to the
matters above discussed, reads: "I call your attention to my opinion set out in the next to the last
poragarph of Release No. 285, which states in substance that the answer to your question depends
upon whether the initial purchaser acquired the securities with a view to distribution, and further
points out that if his acquisitan was wth such intent, he would be an underwriter, so that in general
sales by dealers of securities bought from h:m would not be exempt from registration.
"You will appreciate that the intent of the initial purchaser at the time of the acquisition is a
question of fact upon which I can express no opinion.
"I wish to make clear, however, that I do not believe the fact that the initial purchaser has
stated that his original purchase was for investment and not for resale is necessarily conclusive on
this question. In my opinion there should be considered such other factors as: (1) the relation
between the issuer and the initial purchaser; (2) the business of the latter, as for example, whether
such purchaser is an underwriter or dealer in securities, and, if not, whether the purchase of such a
block of securities for investment is consistent with its geneari operations; and (3) the length of time
elapsing between the acquisition of the securities by the initial purchaser and the date of their proposed resale.
"Of course, if the securities in question were in fact purchased by the initial purchaser for investment rather than for resole, dealers' sales thereof to the public would not necessitate registration
under the Securities Act.
"In conclusion, I feel that I should point out that even though a dealer is satisfied that a particular block of unregistered securities was bought by an initial purchaser for investment, he nevertheless takes the risk that, if his determination is incorrect sales by him of such securities will be
in violation of the registration requirements of the Act."--Op. of Gen'l Counsel, SEC Release No. 603
(Class C), 11 Fed. Reg. 10955 (1935).
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fraud (fraud being difficult to prove in the absence of flagrant market manipulations) the Commission may do no more than investigate and enjoin the selling stockholder, and in the case of a broker
or dealer it may take disciplinary action under section 15 (b) of the
Exchange Act, 13 if it can prove a willful violation. 1 4 The purchaser

can invoke the civil liability provided by section 12 (1) of the Securities Act, but usually, in relation to the amount involved, the
time and expense incurred in such proceedings are substantial, not
to mention the problems of discovery encountered in an action based
upon a secondary distribution.
The rash of mergers and consolidations in recent years, particularly in the case of promotional companies has not been without
Securities Act ramifications. Mergers are carried out under the "no
sale theory" pursuant to Rule 133 which provides:
"For purposes only of Section 5 of the Act, no 'sale,'
'offer to sell,' or 'offer for sale' shall be deemed to be involved so far as the stockholders of a corporation are concerned where, pursuant to statutory provisions in the state
of incorporation or provisions contained in the certificate
of incorporation, there is submitted to the vote of such
stockholders a plan or agreement for a statutory merger or
consolidation or reclassification of securities, or a proposal
for the transfer of assets of such corporation to another person in consideration of the issuance of the securities of such
other person, under such circumstances that the vote of a
required favorable majority (1) will operate to authorize
the proposed transaction so far as concerns the corporation
whose stockholders are voting (except for the taking of action by the directors of the corporation involved and for
compliance with such statutory provisions as the filing of
the plan or agreement with the appropriate state authority), and (2) will bind all stockholders of such corporation
except to the extent that dissenting stockholders may be
entitled, under statutory provisions or provisions contained
in the certificate of incorporation, to receive the appraised
or fair value of their holdings. '""
This rule is not to be confused with section 3 (9) of the Securities Act which exempts from registration any security exchanged
by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where
no commission or other remuneration is paid for soliciting such exchange. Hence the statutory provision is limited to situations where
the securities surrendered and those taken in exchange are both
issued by the same corporation.
Is49 Stat.

1380 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 (1952).
14In the Matter of Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S. E. C. 1111 (1940), the Commission found
a dealer had willfully violated §§ 5 (a) & 17 (a) (2) of the Securities Act in effecfing sales by use
of a prospectus which stated that the stock was being sold at the market and which failed to state
that 60% of the outstanding stock was restricted from transfer, which operated as a restraint upon
market action. In the circumstances, the dealer's reliance upon advice of counsel was held to be no
defense to the charge of "willfull" violation.
Is 17 C. F. R. 230.133 (1957 Supp.). On October 2, 1956 the Commission announced a proposed
revision of Rule 133. (Securities Act Release No. 3698). An effect it would rescind the existing Rule
133 and substitute therefor a rule which would define an "offer" to include the solicitation of a
vote, consent of authorization of stockholders of a corporation in favor of such mergers, consolidations, reclassifications of securities and transfers of assets. Under the revised rule a "sale" would
be deemed to occur when the approval of stockholders-to such corporate action occurs.
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An implicit condition of Rule 133 is a bona fide corporate purpose. It was not intended merely as a device for affecting an unregistered secondary distribution, notwithstanding the more than
occasional efforts to so use it. In SEC v. Micro Moisture Controls,
Inc., 16 it was held that section 4 (1) and Rule 133 of the Securities
Act of 1933 were inapplicable to an exchange of stock of one corporation for assets of another corporation where the acquiring corporation was controlled by stockholders of the acquired corporation and the exchange was merely a step toward the public sale
of stock issued in exchange. The court found that the persons who
were selling the stock controlled the issuer, since they had the power to direct its policies and to obtain the required signatures on a
registration statement.
Also, contrary to a rather popular misconception, securities issued pursuant to a Rule 133 transaction do not automatically acquire an exempt status. In the jargon of the brokerage fraternity
this misconception is referred to as "freeing-up front end stock by
a merger or consolidation." In the Matter of Thompson Ross Securities Co., mentioned above, it was contended by a registered broker
dealer that securities issued under section 3 (a) (9) are forever exempted from registration. In holding against this contention the
Commission stated:
"Unlike securities which fall within Sec. 3 (a) (2) to 3
(a) (8) inclusive, of the Act, there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of securities falling within Sec. 3 (a) (9) which
justifies their permanent exemption from registration. The
basis of the exemption under Sec. 3 (a) (9) is merely the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of securities. The
sale to the public of a large block of securities previously
exempted from registration when they were exchanged for
other securities possesses all of the dangers attendant upon
a new offering of securities to the public by the issuer. Section 3 (a) (9) does not therefore permanently exempt securities offered in a transaction of exchange."17
This holding is equally applicable to merger exchanges pursuant to
Rule 133.
16148 F. Supp. 558 (S. D. N. Y. 1957).
"6

S. E. C. at 1118.
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Assuming that the merger, consolidation, reclassification or
transfer of assets is motivated by a bona fide corporate purpose it
should be noted that Rule 133 begins, "For purposes of Section 5
only. . .

."

Thus stock issued in reliance thereon is exempt from

registration only.
The Colorado and Delaware statutes on merger and consolidation, which are more or less standard, contain no specific requirements about the information to be set forth in the proxy statement.
It is not an uncommon practice to submit the merger proposal without financial statements and with very little factual data. Frequently, the stockholders of the constituents are only told how many
shares they will exchange for each share of the continuing corporation, and the approximate market value of each. Such facts as assumed liabilities, outstanding stock purchase options, management
contracts, fees and costs of the merger, royalty burdens on properties to be acquired and other material facts may not be mentioned.
As this is the type of omission and half truth prohibited by section
17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule X 10 (B) (5) 18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it was believed that there
would be no serious abuse of the section 5 exemption pursuant to
the "no sale" theory. Moreover, companies with listed securities are
also subject to the detailed proxy regulations adopted pursuant to
section 14 of the Exchange Act. Rule X 14 (A) (9) 11requires that
proxy statements contain a full disclosure of material facts.
Experience under Rule 133 indicates that this view was highly
sanguine. It became apparent under the Investment Company Act
of 194020 to which the "no sale" rule was extended shortly after its
enactment that there was insufficient protection to shareholders
against consolidation of affiliated companies on unequal terms. Section 17 (a) of the Investment Company Act prohibits sales of assets
or securities between corporations controlled by a registered investment company, unless the sales have been approved as fair and
equitable by the commission.
In Phoenix Security Corp.,21 two corporations controlled by a
registered company decided to merge. The Commission decided that
17 C. F. R. 240.10 (b) (5) (1949).
19Id. at 240.14 (a) (9).
2D54 Stat. 847, 15 U. S. C. 1 80 (a) (1).(52) (1952).
49 S. E. C. 241 (1941).
-
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since the definition of the word "sale" in the Investment Company
Act is practically the same as in the Securities Act, the "no sale"
rule should be held applicable to the transaction in question and,
hence, the terms of the merger did not have to be approved. Under
such literal interpretation, two affiliates controlled by a third might
well decide to merge on unfair and inequitable terms, and minority
shareholders would have as little protection as in case of a conventional sale of securities between the companies. In 1953, the Commission reversed the Phoenix case stating that continued experience
under the Investment Company Act demonstrated that application
of the "no sale" theory to section 17 thereof tended to defeat the
2
legislative purpose of that section. 1
One of the few cases involving an alleged civil liability grounded upon a merger transaction is National Supply Co. v. Stanford
University.2 Denial of recovery was based primarily on the stockholder's negligence in failing to make timely objection to the plan
of consolidation. The contention that the proxy statement was misleading was rather summarily disposed of by the court. Stanford
argued that it was led to believe that it might retain its preferred
stock, nothwithstanding the consolidation, and that it was not advised of its right by a timely objection to claim the appraised value
of its shares. The court said that a dissatisfied stockholder should
be held to a degree of diligence in informing himself of, and in asserting, his rights.
"He may not by inaction speculate upon the outcome of
the merger. He is not permitted to plead ignorance of the
law of the state of incorporation if he has negligently failed
to inform himself thereof. He may not unreasonably delay
the bringing of suit, either for the value of his shares or for
equitable relief against what he claims is an unfair merger,
to the prejudice of existing shareholders or those who may
become such in the interim."24
The court stated that certain of the findings of the trial court
(which had held in Stanford's favor) indicated that the trial court
was influenced by the contention that the Securities Act of 1933
had been violated. However, since the SEC had filed a brief amicus
curiae indicative of its view that the consolidation did not involve
a "sale" of securities, and that the civil liabilities provisions of the
Act were inapplicable, the court considered neither the questions
of section 5 violation nor possible violations of section 17 (a) or
Rule X 10 (B) (5). It merely concluded "Without going into the
matter, we may
say that we are in accord with the views of the
2 5
Commission.

Whatever the respective merits and defects of the proposed revision of Rule 133 may be, it must be considered in the light of an
era of numerous facile mergers and consolidations.
2 In the Matter of E. I. Dupont Investment Co., Act Release No. 1837 (1953), C. C. H. Fed. Sec.
Law Rep. P. 76, 213.
23 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 773 (1943).
2' Id. at 692.
2 Id. at 694.

